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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine generic competition in the UK, with a special focus on the role of Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA) on generic market entry and diffusion. In the UK, where no direct price regulation on pharmaceuticals 
exists, HTA has a leading role for recommending the use of medicines providing a non-regulatory aspect that may influence 
the dynamics in the generic market. The paper focuses on the role of Technology Appraisals issued by the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). We follow a two-step approach. First, we examine the probability of generic entry. 
Second, conditional on generic entry, we examine the determinants of generic market share. We use data from IQVIA British 
Pharmaceutical Index (BPI) for the primary care market for 60 products that lost patent between 2003 and 2012. Our results 
suggest that market size remains one of the main drivers of generic entry. After controlling for market size, intermolecular 
substitution and difficulty of manufacturing increase the likelihood of generic entry. After generic entry, our estimates sug-
gest that generic market share is highly state dependent. Our findings also suggest that while NICE recommendations do 
influence generic uptake, there is only marginal evidence they affect generic entry.
Keywords Generic entry · Generic competition · Market share · NICE
JEL Classification I11 · I18
Introduction
The pharmaceutical sector is highly regulated including 
marketing approval, medicine reimbursement and intellec-
tual property rights (IPR). Regulators face the challenge of 
providing long term incentives for research and development 
for new medicines, on the one hand, and ensuring fast(er) 
access to generic versions of the originator product once 
the last element of IPR expires, on the other. The US and 
Europe use similar tools to try to address this challenge. The 
Hatch-Waxman Act in the US, formally known as the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Public 
Law 98-417), gives incentives to both generic and branded 
pharmaceutical companies to enter the market. It reduces 
the costs of entry to generic manufacturers, including the 
possibility of using an abbreviated regulatory pathway, and 
starting their bioequivalence studies before patent expiry. 
The Act also compensates manufacturers of the branded 
product for the time lost (up to five years) from the pat-
ent term because of the regulatory process—the so-called 
patent term extensions or market/data exclusivities (see for 
instance [21]).
In Europe, the so called “Bolar exemption” (which is 
governed by European Directive 2001/83/EC on the Com-
munity Code relating to medicinal products for human use, 
as amended by European Directive 2004/27/EC, particu-
larly Article 10 thereof) was introduced to exempt from 
patent infringement the tests and trials necessary to use the 
abridged procedure for obtaining marketing authorisation 
for generics. Historically, this risk of patent infringement 
potentially deterred generics manufacturers from carrying 
out the tests required to obtain marketing authorisation until 
after patent expiry, resulting in a delay of market entry of 
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generics. And for branded (patented) pharmaceuticals, there 
exists the so-called ‘8+2(+1)’ policy, which grants eight 
years of data exclusivity, two for market protection,1 and the 
(+1) for additional market protection for a new indication 
to manufacturers.2
Generic medicines also enjoy an “abbreviated” regulatory 
pathway, because information is already available on the 
safety and efficacy of the reference medicine, thus requiring 
generic manufacturers to demonstrate bioequivalence3 and 
same quality standards as the branded product. Marketing 
authorisation for generics in Europe depends on the regula-
tory incentives, as defined by the ‘8+2(+1)’ framework out-
lined before. However, when they effectively enter a country, 
and how much they are used, will depend on a number of 
variables, including how their prices, reimbursement, pre-
scription, and dispensing are regulated in any one country.
In some countries like the UK there is an economic evalu-
ation to recommend the use (or not) of health technologies 
and medicines in particular. In recent years, these evalua-
tions tend to focus on new medicines at launch, which is not 
relevant for our analysis. However, such economic evalua-
tions can also be done at therapy level, looking at a group of 
(potentially interchangeable) medicines, and usually driven 
by the fact that the first molecule has seen its patent expire. 
In the UK, these group assessments so-called multiple tech-
nology appraisals were done for those treatments included 
in our sample.
Despite the increasing trend in generic share in most 
OECD countries, generic shares differ across countries. 
The UK has one of the largest generic shares in Europe—it 
accounted for around 84% of the total volume of the pharma-
ceutical market in 2014 compared to 65% in 2000 [34, 35]. 
Cross-country comparisons show there is scope to generate 
savings, especially in countries with more limited use of 
generics, through increased generic share [25]. This means 
that demand for generic medicines should continue to rise 
as payers pursue avenues to reduce costs. Indeed, the gener-
ics market has attracted significant policy analyses over the 
last decades, as countries aim to reap maximum benefits 
from generic entry.4 Some countries have been more suc-
cessful than others in reaping those benefits, as the degree 
of generic competition (and thus savings derived from the 
use of generics) depends on the type of demand and/or sup-
ply policies implemented in each country to expand generic 
use.5 In this paper, we focus in the UK market, where we 
provide additional evidence on the factors driving generic 
competition for the period 2003–2013. The analysis exam-
ines the (chemical) molecules losing patent protection and 
facing generic competition through 2003–2012.
Our paper differs from the existing literature in several 
aspects. First, we explicitly model separately entry from dif-
fusion of generic products. Most papers in the generics lit-
erature look at either number of entrants [17, 46], the impact 
on prices [41, 48], generic revenue [42] and/or market share 
post-patent expiration [4, 45]. In this paper, we explicitly 
model in two stages generic entry and generic diffusion. 
In the first stage, we look into the probability of generic 
entry. [16] examined the probability of entry within 3 years 
after patent expires in the US market. However, recent data 
shows that in most European markets generic entry mostly 
happens within the first year after the loss of exclusivity 
[25]. Therefore, we exploit the panel structure of our dataset 
and account for generic entry exactly at the time when it 
occurs. In the second stage, conditional on entry, we look 
into generic diffusion using generic market share in a context 
of a dynamic model to allow for adjustment costs along the 
uptake of generic prescription.
Second, to the best of our knowledge this is the first 
paper to examine the role of Health Technology Assessment 
(HTA) into generic entry and diffusion. Price regulation has 
been shown to have a negative impact on generic prices and 
entry [11, 29]. In the UK context, where there is no (direct) 
price regulation on pharmaceutical products, the only 
1 Data Exclusivity prohibits the re-use of clinical trials data, and 
thus generics cannot be validated by the relevant regulator—the Food 
and Drugs Administration (FDA) in the US and European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) respectively. Market exclusivity prohibits the copy 
and marketing of the medicines during the exclusivity period—for 
instance, in Europe, until after 10 years a drug cannot be placed in the 
market even if it has received marketing authorisation.
2 There are also additional incentives for orphan medicinal products 
and paediatric investigations of medicinal products, which are beyond 
our scope—but noting that such incentives obviously will delay entry 
of generic medicines.
3 Bioequivalence means that the generic medicine produces the same 
levels of the active substance in the body as the reference medicine.
4 For instance, the European Commission competition inquiry of 
2009 into the pharmaceutical sector led to regular monitoring exer-
cises to better understand factors that delayed generic market entry 
to the detriment of the European consumer (https ://ec.europ a.eu/
compe titio n/secto rs/pharm aceut icals /inqui ry/). More recently, it was 
argued generic policies vary greatly between countries (see the 2018 
Copenhagen Economics report https ://ec.europ a.eu/docsr oom/docum 
ents/29521 ), and yet many OECD countries do not fully exploit the 
potential of generic entry [5].
5 Examples of demand-side policies aimed at exploiting the poten-
tial of off-patent medicines include mandatory generic prescribing, 
incentives (financial and non-financial) for physicians to prescribe 
generics, incentives for pharmacists to substitute branded products for 
generics, and education programmes to encourage consumer uptake, 
which collectively will help drive generic uptake and competition. 
Supply-side policies include pressure on generic prices, in the form of 
internal reference pricing, price capping or relative price with respect 
to the branded product, preferential and shortened licensing and/or 
registration review of product dossiers for generic products [5, 25, 26, 
50].
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non-regulatory aspect that may have a direct influence in 
generic uptake is that of technology appraisals issued by the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). 
NICE publishes technology appraisals (TA) recommending 
the use of medicines after a review process of the evidence 
balancing their clinical effectiveness against their economic 
implications.
It is important to highlight two types of TAs carried out 
by NICE: single technology appraisals (STAs) and multi-
ple technology appraisals (MTAs). The former applies for 
patented, branded medicines at launch; the latter is for a 
group of medicines for the same indication, including not 
only branded but also generic products for at least one of the 
molecules included in the MTA if available. All molecules 
in our sample have been subject to HTA through guidance 
published in MTAs. For the purposes of our analysis, MTAs 
are the relevant ones, as they may recommend the use of the 
most cost-effective alternative, usually the generic version 
with a lower price (and same effectiveness).
TAs have the capacity to correct for inappropriate prac-
tices in medicine prescription. The underlying hypothesis 
is that generic uptake may be more attractive if guidance 
states that the molecule is recommended for the treatment 
of certain condition, as this is an indicator of the superiority 
of the molecule with respect to other competing molecules. 
NICE may also recommend the cheapest version of a sam-
ple of similar medicines (with different active ingredients), 
which could thus have a positive impact on generic usage.6 
In some instances, NICE issues a restricted recommenda-
tion limiting the use of the molecule under certain condi-
tions or does not recommend the use of a product. This may 
reduce the expected profitability of the market and therefore 
decrease the likelihood of entry. Although the data used in 
the paper is for the UK and NICE publishes guidance for 
England only, NICE guidance is relevant UK-wide given 
that: (1) NICE provides guidance that is formally recog-
nised in Wales and Northern Ireland and it works closely 
with Scotland; and (2) there exists a consultation process 
between NICE and these countries during the development 
stage of its guidance, therefore, making any alignment in 
recommendations very likely. There is some evidence sug-
gesting a certain level of agreement between agencies, and 
specially the role that NICE to influence decisions of other 
HTA bodies [32, 33, 40].7 In addition, England is the coun-
try with the largest market, accounting for approximately 
80% of sales in the UK, and therefore the UK and England 
sales market are not significantly different.
Generic market shares in the UK have been on the rise 
in the last few years and international comparisons indi-
cate they are among the highest in the OECD, as discussed 
above. Post-patent expiring some molecules still see a delay 
in a generic entry or face no generic competition, reducing 
the potential gains that generic entry typically introduces 
through reduced prices. The aim of the paper is to examine 
those market and product characteristics that affect generic 
entry and diffusion in the UK, paying particular attention 
to the role of HTA as a non-regulatory aspect signalling 
the expected profitability to potential entrants. Our results 
suggest that generic entry is affected by market size, with 
larger markets signaling higher expected profitability, higher 
degree of intermolecular competition and difficulty of manu-
facturing. Our estimates also suggest that delays in generic 
entry after patent expires decrease substantially the probabil-
ity of entry. Generic diffusion shows large state dependency 
and is largely determined by the size of the molecule market. 
We find no evidence of an effect of NICE TAs on generic 
entry, but this is in contrast to the large effect of NICE guid-
ance in generic diffusion.
The paper is structured as follows. Next section provides 
a summary of the key factors identified in the literature to 
affect generic competition. Section 3 frames the empiri-
cal specification for each stage of the analysis. Section 4 
describes the data used and some descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion 5 presents the results and the final section concludes.
Dynamics in the off‑patent market
As the patent protection for branded medicines comes to 
an end, incumbent manufacturers may engage in strategic 
behaviour to deter entry by generic competitors. Empirical 
evidence shows that incumbents in smaller markets lower 
their prices in response to potential entry, whereas medicines 
in larger markets modify prices to a lower degree potentially 
as the threat of entry remains irrespective of any strategic 
behaviour from the incumbent [6, 48]. Other than pricing, 
manufacturers may use advertising and presentation prolif-
eration as instruments for strategic behaviour, however, there 
is only weak evidence suggesting incumbent firms engage in 
entry-deterring practices [16, 46].
Incumbent firms may also use authorized generic entry, 
whereby the patent holder license the marketing of a generic 
to a partner firm, in an attempt to maximise profits when 
the loss of exclusivity approaches. This practice potentially 
threatens generic competition by securing a first-mover 
advantage in the generic market even prior to patent expiry. 
6 This was the case of statins, for instance, for which Technology 
appraisal guidance (TA94) was issued in 2006 but later updated and 
replaced in its Clinical Guideline CG181 (Available at: https ://www.
nice.org.uk/guida nce/cg181 /chapt er/1-Recom menda tions ).
7 It is worth noting that these references look at the agreement 
between agencies for particular drugs and may not accurately reflect 
the concordance in recommendations between UK agencies for the 
drugs we study. For instance, [32] examines agreements in decisions 
for orphan drugs, whereas [40] look at cancer drugs.
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[22] studied a sample of 31 drugs that lost patent in the late 
90s to find that increases in the share of authorised gener-
ics in Canada increases the price of the branded product, 
limiting market competition. [43] use data on 31 medicines 
that expired in the US in the late 80s and early 90s and find 
evidence that authorized generics limit generic price compe-
tition and allocate a larger profitability to the branded prod-
uct. [2] examined 79 medicines expiring between 2002 and 
2007 in Germany and found no effect of authorized generic 
entry on subsequent generic entry. These differences could 
potentially be explained by the regulatory context of each 
study. In the US for instance, there is an 180-day exclusiv-
ity period for the first generic entrant and hence the impor-
tance of being first. This market exclusivity does not exist 
in Europe.
Market size for the branded medicine at the point of pat-
ent expiry appears to be a good predictor for generic entry 
[2, 16, 19, 23, 30, 42, 45] and to reduce delays in generic 
launch [11]. [45] estimated an average of two extra generic 
entrants per year for blockbuster medicines (defined as pre-
generic sales higher than $500 m per annum). In line with 
this, the evidence points towards a reduction of the market 
exclusivity period (strictly speaking this is the total time a 
branded product is on the market before a generic entry) for 
larger markets, and this is specially acute for blockbuster 
medicines [20].
There is an ambiguous effect of generic entry on the price 
of the branded medicine. In line with the expected market 
prediction, there is a price drop when the firm loses exclusiv-
ity [6, 45]. There is also evidence of the opposite effect, with 
the incumbent firm increasing the branded price in response 
to generic competition [17, 41], although this result mainly 
applies to the US market. To explain this counterintuitive 
result, it has been argued that the branded medicine firm 
increase prices to retain only loyal consumers (patients and 
physicians) with inelastic demand [27, 41].
When the demand-side becomes a barrier to generic con-
sumption, there are a number of regulatory policies that are 
effective in inducing a shift from branded to generic medi-
cines directed to different agents: (1) incentives for physi-
cians can include physician budgets linked to incentives or 
sanctions; (2) allowing pharmacists to substitute generic 
for branded medicines (possibly linked with incentives); 
(3) requiring patients to pay for the additional cost of the 
branded medicine [47]. These demand-side incentives have 
encouraged switching to generics [26, 47], especially if they 
were linked to financial incentives [24].
With generic entry there is an expected increase in num-
ber of competitors that drive generic prices down [17, 48], 
although this effect is larger for drugs that compete in larger-
markets [36]. The overall effect is that of a decrease in the 
generic to branded price ratio, although the relationship is 
not linear i.e. the reduction of prices for the nth entrant is 
lower as n increases. [20] estimated that after 12 months the 
ratio of generic to brand price in the US market was 90% 
with one entrant, 63% with five entrants and 40% with ten 
entrants. [45] find that on average each additional generic 
entrant induced nearly a 2.3% monthly decrease in the rela-
tive price and [42] suggest that prices could continue to fall 
with up to nine entrants. As the relative price is reduced with 
the number of entrants, the share of the incumbent branded 
medicine shrinks [4] and generic share rise [45]. The impact 
on competition goes beyond that of intramolecular competi-
tion (between generic and incumbent), to affect price compe-
tition at the intermolecular level. The number of competing 
on-patent branded products within the same therapeutical 
area pushes generic prices down [42] at the same time that 
encourages generic entry [2].
Market dynamics after patent expiry may also be altered 
by regulation in the pharmaceutical sector, mainly limit-
ing competition among generic manufacturers. Pricing and 
reimbursement regulation are factors that have been shown 
to have ambiguous effects in generic entry. Price regulation 
generally appears to be associated with delays in launching 
generic products [11], reduced incentives for generic entry, 
and limited diffusion after entry [13, 18, 29, 47]. In contrast, 
regulation may reduce the branded price [6] and may even 
encourage generic entry driving prices down [12, 14, 26].
Probably an unintended consequence of generic entry is 
intermolecular substitution in medicine consumption. There 
is inconclusive evidence on the degree of substitutability. 
Molecules going off-patent may capture part of the market 
for similar branded molecules within the same therapeuti-
cal group [1, 7]. Yet, there is also evidence of a shift in 
consumption from the off-patent medicine market to the 
consumption of other branded molecules (with no generic 
entry) within the same therapeutical group [49].
Empirical strategy
Likelihood of entry
The first stage of the paper focuses on the likelihood of 
generic entry after the patent expires, exploiting the vari-
ation around the time of entry in the UK for the molecules 
that lost patent protection in the period 2003–2012. For each 
molecule i across the nine therapeutical groups j studied, the 
probability of generic entry at time t is expressed as
where yijt equals 1 if there has been generic entry for mol-
ecule i in therapuetical group j at t, xijt is a vector of vari-
ables including the expected profitability in the molecule 
(1)P(yijt = 1|xijt, ci) = F(x�it + ci)
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market, as measured by a number of proxies for market size 
and prices, medicine characteristics, product competition 
and technological guidance by NICE. ci is the unobserved 
heterogeneity of molecule i.
We use the random effects probit model to estimate  , 
incorporating the Chamberlain–Mundlank correction [10, 
31] to allow the unobserved effect ci to be correlated to the 
explanatory variables. This approach requires the following 
specification of the unobserved effect:
This parameterisation means that the probit model is aug-
mented including the within-molecule average of the time-
varying explanatory variables.
Market share dynamics
In the second stage of our analysis, conditional on generic 
entry, we examine the dynamics of generic diffusion. Our 
variable of interest is the share of the generic prescription 
over the total volume of prescriptions (in counting units). 
We use a dynamic panel data model to capture the underly-
ing dynamic relationship in the spread of generic products. 
The dynamic specification allows the generic market share 
to depend on the market share in t − 1 as a way to control for 
any adjustment costs in the generic diffusion process. Our 
empirical specification has the following form:
with |𝛼| < 1 ; i=1,2,...,60 and t=2,3,...,11. The dependent 
variable msijt is the volume market share of the generic prod-
uct of molecule i in therapeutical group j at time t, msijt−1 is 
the lagged market share, while xit is a vector of additional 
explanatory variables identified as potential important deter-
minants of generic spread, which includes a range of price 
variables, difficulty in manufacturing, market size, number 
of years since the loss of patent and degree of competition 
in the market. The error term is defined as i + it where 
i is the unobserved molecule-specific effect, and captures 
time-invariant heterogeneity across molecules. it is the dis-
turbance term, assumed independent across individuals and 
serially uncorrelated.
The System GMM approach [8] was preferred to the 
Difference GMM approach [3] as generally produces more 
efficient and precise estimates [9]. A system with equations 
in differences and equations in levels is built. System GMM 
takes first-differences to remove the individual effects:
Even if the first-difference transformation elimi-
nates the fixed effects, there is a correlation between 
(2)ci = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1x̄i + ui, ui ∼ Normal(0, 𝜎2u)
(3)msijt = msij,t−1 + x�it + i + it
(4)Δmsijt = Δmsij,t−1 + Δx�it + Δit
Δmsij,t−1 = msij,t−1 − msij,t−2 and Δijt = ijt − ijt−1 . System 
GMM uses lags msij,t−2 , msij,t−3,...,msij1 as instruments for 
the equations in differences and Δmsij,t−1 for the equations 
in levels.
Data
The analysis has been conducted using the IQVIA British 
Pharmaceutical Index (IQVIA BPI) for the primary care 
market for the period quarter 4 2002—quarter 4 2013.8 The 
molecules included in the analysis lost patent between the 
first quarter of 2003 and the last quarter of 2012. The sam-
ple therefore covered patents expiring until quarter 4 2012 
(excluding any product losing patent in 2013) to allow at 
least 12 months data for products that lost patent protec-
tion in 2012. Although our data is available on a quarterly 
basis we have aggregated the variables yearly to avoid any 
seasonal effect.
A total of 60 molecules are included in our sample spread 
across nine therapeutic classes, facing generic competition in 
primary care. The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) 
groups included in the analysis were: medicines for obstruc-
tive airway diseases (R03), lipid-modifying agents (Statins) 
(C10), anti-epileptic (N03) medicines, agents acting on the 
renin-angiotensin system (C09), psychoanaleptics (N06), 
analgesics (N02), ophthalmologicals (S01), other nervous 
system medicines (N07) and antipsoriatics (D05). These 
therapeutic classes were the top nine biggest primary care 
markets in cash (at list prices) in the UK in 2012.
In the first stage, our dependent variable is an indica-
tor variable equal to one when generic entry happens. We 
exploit the variation in generic entry, which follows either 
immediately after the patent expires or with a time lag. The 
dependent variable in the second stage is the generic market 
share (ms) calculated as the total counting units for generic 
medicines at molecule level divided by the total counting 
units (generics plus branded products) at molecule level. 
Our measure of market share uses counting units, and not 
cash sales, as sales could be masking prices changes along 
the trajectory of generic entry.
For each molecule in the sample, we use a range of mar-
ket size measures as potential determinants of entry. First, 
we include the percentage of the cash sales of a molecule 
over the total of the therapeutic class cash sales (Share Mol/
ATC ). Second, we use the sales value in the 4 quarters prior 
8 We are unable to use information after 2013 due to a change in how 
IQVIA data was collected.
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to patent expiring (Sales LOP). The third variable included 
is the absolute cash market value at molecule level for each 
year (Sales). The last variable we use is the price of the 
branded product (Price Branded) as proxy for the potential 
price generic-branded differential that entrants may exploit 
to compete with.9 The branded price is per counting unit 
and defined as IQVIA BPI yearly cash sales of the branded 
products divided by the counting unit by molecule. In the 
second stage, we also use the relative price of generic vs. 
branded products (Relative Price), where generic price is 
also measured by counting unit as the IQVIA BPI yearly 
cash sales of the generic products divided by the counting 
unit by molecule.
We do not have information on the number of entrants 
within each molecule market (IQVIA BPI only collects 
information at the molecules level in the UK and therefore 
there is no information on individual manufacturers). Using 
sample data we generate the number of molecules that have 
lost patent within the same ATC group as a proxy for thera-
peutical competition (Num). This is a proxy for intermo-
lecular rather than intramolecular competition and it is a 
lower bound estimate, given that other molecules with the 
same ATC code may have gone off-patent earlier than 2003. 
However, it allows controlling for the relative position of the 
molecule with respect to competing molecules within the 
same therapeutical groups. If molecules within therapeutical 
groups are interlinked as some evidence suggests [7, 49], we 
will be able to determine if there exists an intermolecular 
effect in generic entry.
From 2005 onwards, we have a proxy for intramolecular 
competition which indicates whether the generic market is 
competitive or not. The way the generics market is regulated 
(or rather, controlled and monitored) in the UK suffered a 
significant change in 2005 [28, 37]. Broadly speaking, sup-
ply shortages (due to various factors) and the way the former 
regulation handled those led to significant price increases for 
some high-selling generic medicines. The DH was not reap-
ing the benefits of the discounts given by generic companies 
to retail pharmacists. As a result, the so-called Category (M)
anufacturer and (W)holesaler were introduced, which among 
other things, led to manufacturers and wholesalers providing 
information on prices net of discounts to the DH, as well as 
distinguishing between the degree of competition (proxied 
by the number of generic manufacturers supplying generic 
versions of a particular molecule) in terms of the regulation 
enforced. The change put greater reliance on competition to 
control generic prices, although the generics market became 
more closely monitored than ever before.10 We use the Cat-
egory M classification as our competition variable (catM), 
which is an indicator variable equal to one if there are three 
or more generic manufacturers in the market. The definition 
of this variable is conditional on generic entry after patent 
expires, therefore it is only relevant in the second stage of 
the analysis.
Generic entry and diffusion may also be deterred by 
manufacturing complexity, as there will be fixed costs of 
production associated to entering the off-patent market as 
input requirements may differ across product categories. 
Therefore we distinguish molecules by their degree of manu-
facturing complexity and classify them as either easy (e.g. 
tablets, capsules, (Easy)), difficult (e.g. syringes, inhalers; 
(Difficult)) or combination (when molecules are available 
with both easy and difficult formulations; (Combination)), 
following the criteria used by [39].
We further investigate the role of NICE TAs on entry and 
diffusion. We classify molecules according to whether there 
is no TA available (No TA), the TA does not recommend 
the use of the molecule (TA NoRec), there exists a TA but 
is restricted (TA Rest)(that is, only recommends use in spe-
cial cases) and whether the TA recommends the use of the 
molecule (TA Rec)11. As discussed earlier, all our molecules 
with a TA refer to an MTA and therefore the guidance will 
include any recommendation for specific molecules, includ-
ing the use of a cheaper generic counterpart. It is worth 
noting that the TA may have been issued at any point during 
the sample period, irrespective of when the patent of the 
branded product expired. We also observe variation in rec-
ommendations over time. This may happen for instance if 
the TA is initially issued as restricted but it changes to being 
broadly recommended in subsequent years.
11 The variable on NICE TA’s was collected by assessing coverage 
of patients recommended to have access to the medicine, as stated in 
the decision, relative to the medicines license/scope of the appraisal. 
Using a theoretical example if 100 patients could potentially be rec-
ommended to have access to the medicine and NICE, in fact, recom-
mend that only 80 should have access, then the decision is defined as 
“restricted”. Such a restriction is invariably based on specific clini-
cal characteristics. For a discussion of restricted decisions and spe-
cific examples see [38]. Similarly, if NICE recommended the use of a 
medicine by all relevant patients, the decision was defined as “recom-
mended”.
9 In the UK, there is no price regulation for branded products, instead 
pharmaceuticals can set prices under the Pharmaceutical Price Regu-
lation Scheme (PPRS), a profit control system, that limits the return 
on capital and return on sales to be up to 21% and 6%, respectively
10 In the documents that put forward the new 2005 regulation, the 
DH stated that “where there is effective competition in respect of any 
given generic medicine, the DH would not interfere in the operation 
of that market for that medicine” (page 7, [15]); however, the DH also 
stated they would intervene if the normal market mechanisms failed 
to ensure that the NHS paid a fair price for the medicine(s) concerned 
[15]. Further regulation in the UK has given more controlling and 
monitoring powers to the DH, including 2017 Health Service Medical 
Supplies (Costs) Act. It should be noted that currently further changes 
to the functioning of the off-patent market in the UK are being con-
sidered.
Footnote 10 (continued)




Table 1 shows the molecules in each ATC group, as well as 
the percentage of molecules with generic entry. Of the 60 
molecules included in the analysis, 41 (68%) faced generic 
competition in the period considered. In particular, all the 
molecules in the C10 (Statins) and N02 (Analgesics) faced 
generic competition and over 75% of the molecules in the 
N07 (Other nervous system medicines), N06 (Psychoana-
leptics), N03 (Anti-epileptic) and C09 (Agents acting on the 
renin-angiotensin system) ATC. Only the ATC D05 (Antip-
soriatics) and S01 (Ophthalmologicals) did not face strong 
generic competition.
Of the 60 molecules analysed 27 (45%) where classi-
fied as easy to manufacture, 18 as difficult and 15 had a 
combination of easy and difficult formulation. C9 (Agents 
acting on the renin-angiotensin system), C10 (Statins), N03 
(Anti-epileptic) and N06 (Psychoanaleptics) were the only 
ATC2 with at least three quarters of formulations classified 
as easy, whilst S01 (Ophthalmologicals) and D05 (Antipso-
riatics) have mainly difficult formulations to manufacture. 
We exclude the molecule Memantine (ATC code N06) in 
our sample because it is the only molecule for which NICE 
did not recommend its use and faced no generic entry. The 
lack of variation in generic entry leads to all observations 
for Memantine being dropped from the estimation process 
and we are therefore unable to include this molecule. For 
consistency, we also dropped it in the second stage when 
looking at generic diffusion.
If we consider the 47 molecules with cash sales above 
£1 million in the 12 months prior the loss of patent, we 
notice that 17 of them have sales above the molecule aver-
age (£56m for the 12 months prior loss of patent), and all 
the 7 molecules above £100 m have generics competition. 
Figure 1 shows that all the molecules with cash sales above 
Table 1  ATC Groups and 
molecules included in the 
sample
Source: IQVIA British Pharmaceutical Index (BPI). Data for the primary care sector only. Q4 2002—Q4 
2013






C09 14 12 86% 3 21% 0 0% 11 79%
C10 4 4 100% 1 25% 0 0% 3 75%
D05 6 1 17% 1 17% 5 83% 0 0%
N02 4 4 100% 3 75% 0 0% 1 25%
N03 4 3 75% 1 25% 0 0% 3 75%
N06 4 3 75% 1 25% 0 0% 3 75%
N07 7 6 86% 3 43% 0 0% 4 57%
R03 8 5 63% 2 25% 4 50% 2 25%
S01 9 3 33% 0 0% 9 100% 0 0%
Total 60 41 68% 15 25% 18 30% 27 45%
Fig. 1  Molecules over £1 m 
sales 12 months prior LOP 
by difficulty in manufactur-
ing and market size. Source: 
Authors’ calculations based on 
IQVIA BPI. Notes: Number 
of molecules with the generic 
competition are displayed in 
green according to the difficulty 
of manufacturing and market 
size. Red circles show the 
number of molecules with no 
generic competition
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the average have generics competition independently of the 
difficulty in manufacturing, whilst for molecules with sales 
below the average (but above £1 m), 7 do not have generics 
competition.
Despite the UK being one of the OECD countries with 
the highest generic share of the total volume in the phar-
maceutical market (generic share accounted for 85% of the 
total volume in 2016, see [35]), post-patent expiry differ-
ences in generic penetration exist across molecules. These 
differences in generic share also persist regardless of the 
requirement for prescribers to write prescriptions using the 
generic name, even when only a branded medicine is avail-
able. Where a generic medicine exist, prescribers may also 
opt to prescribe the branded product if deemed appropriate. 
Figure 2 shows differences in generic share for a selection of 
molecules in each of the ATC groups present in our sample. 
The trend in generic market share is presented against the 
number of years since the patent expired. Whereas some 
generic products take over the market almost immediately, 
other medicines experience a gradual increase in generic 
share over time and for some others generic penetration is 
Fig. 2  Trends in Generic Market Share. Source: IQVIA British Phar-
maceutical Index (BPI). Notes: Molecules shown are a selection of 
molecules in the sample to illustrate some of the generic share trends 
observed. We have selected a molecule from each ATC to reflect dif-
ferences in generic share after patent expires. These molecules are not 
representative of the trend in their ATC and other molecules within 
the same ATC may present a different generic share trend
Table 2  Likelihood of Generic 
Entry—Average Partial Effects
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. We use averaged variables over the year, except for the variable 
(Share Mol/ATC ) for which we use data for the quarter with the highest market share. Using the average 
over the year provides virtually identical results. Variables Sales LOP, Sales and Price Branded are logged. 
Reference categories for sales quantiles is the lowest quantile, for difficulty of manufacturing is Easy, and 
for NICE TA is No TA issued. APEs for the time-varying variables used to parameterise the individual 
effect are not shown here for parsimony. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Dep. Variable 
Generic Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share L.Share Sales Sales Sales Price
Mol/ATC Mol/ATC LOP Quantile Branded
Market Size 0.0349 0.296 0.0669*** 0.00977 0.150







Num 0.226*** 0.271*** 0.166*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.223***
(0.0591) (0.0724) (0.0418) (0.0394) (0.0484) (0.0606)
Difficult 0.378*** 0.399*** 0.200*** 0.230** 0.155* 0.392***
(0.127) (0.134) (0.0602) (0.0913) (0.0912) (0.114)
Combination 0.139* 0.181*** 0.0213 0.0269 0.0292 0.148**
(0.0761) (0.0621) (0.0352) (0.0517) (0.0480) (0.0739)
NICE TA Rest −0.0139 −0.0102 −0.00757 −0.0145 −0.0533 −0.0122
(0.0640) (0.0669) (0.0452) (0.0496) (0.0516) (0.0662)
NICE TA Rec 0.163 0.180 0.124* 0.102 0.0360 0.163
(0.141) (0.154) (0.0742) (0.0769) (0.0731) (0.133)
Observations 649 590 649 649 649 643
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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relatively low over time. We exploit this variation across 
medicines to examine the determinants of market share for 
generic products.
Probability of entry
In this section, we present the results of estimating Eq.  1. 
Table 2 shows the average partial effects (APEs) of the vari-
ables of interest on the probability of generic entry. This APEs 
are computed using a random effect model, corrected with the 
Chamberlain-Mudlank device. We test a number of variables 
that capture the potential market size and structure for generic 
products. Column (1) shows the results when using the share 
of the molecule over the overall ATC market. Although the 
sign is positive, the estimate is statistically insignificant. Lag-
ging this variable as in Column (2) yields the same results. 
Column (3) shows that the sales in the 4 quarters prior to 
patent expiry (Sales LOP) is statistically significant and had 
a positive impact on the probability of entry. The variable is 
logged so the APE shows that an increase in 10% in sales in 
the four quarters before the patent expires increases the prob-
ability of generic entry by 0.6 percentage points (pp).
Column (4) includes the variable sales but the estimate is 
insignificant. Following [43] and [48], we explored whether 
market size effects differ across the distribution of market 
sales. We first split the market according to sales above or 
below the median, but results (not shown here) were not 
precisely estimated. We further defined four dummies for 
sales quantiles (reference category is the lowest quantile). 
Specification in Column (5) presents the APEs linked to the 
quantile dummies, and shows that the likelihood of entry is 
20 and 18 pp higher with respect to the molecule with the 
lowest sales quantile, with no effect of being at the top sales 
distribution. Column (6) shows the APEs when we include 
the price of the branded medicine but the estimate is statisti-
cally insignificant.
The other variables on ATC market competition, difficulty 
of manufacturing and NICE variable show consistent esti-
mates across specifications. The variable Num that proxies 
for the expected intermolecular competition shows a higher 
probability of entry if other molecules in the same thera-
peutical market have lost patent. The likelihood of entry is 
between 16pp and 28pp higher per each additional molecule 
losing patent within the same ATC. The probability of entry 
is between 15pp and 40pp higher for products of difficult 
manufacturing compared to those of easy manufacturing. 
Whether the product is of combination manufacturing does 
not affect the probability of entry. The variable NICE only 
has a statistically significant effect in Column (3), whereby 
a NICE TA that recommends the medicine increases the 
likelihood of generic entry by 12pp.
After patent expiry, generic competition drives prices 
down offering potentially large savings for the public funder, 
the NHS. For a number of products in our sample, we do not 
observe generic entry immediately after the patent expires 
and there exists a delay in entry. We explore how this delay 
affects the overall probability of entry by including the fol-
lowing: (1) a dummy equal one if the molecule does not 
have entry immediately after patent expires within the same 
year (Delay), accounting both for molecules that had later 
generic entry as well as those with no entry at all during our 
study period; (2) a variable that accounts for the number of 
years since loss of patent (Years LOP); (3) the interaction 
of (1) and (2). The interaction will capture the impact of 
each additional year since patent expiry for those molecules 
that do not enter the generic market at the time of patent 
loss. Following the results in Table 2 on the significance of 
market size variables, we estimate these models using the 
market size variables Sales LOP and Sales both in total and 
split by quantiles. Results in Table 3 show the APEs for the 
main variables of interest.
In line with the results in Table 2, only sales in the four 
quarters prior to patent expiring and quintiles of sales are 
significant, as per columns (1) and (3). The APEs for Delay, 
suggest that if entry does not occur at the point of patent loss 
the probability of generic entry is reduced considerably by 
approximately 25pp. The APE for (Years LOP) is evaluated 
in those cases for which there was no immediate generic 
entry at point of patent loss (Years LOP (Delay=1)). For 
molecules that did not face generic competition straight after 
patent loss, an additional year from patent loss increases the 
likelihood of entry by 3.8pp. There are large implications 
arising from these estimates, as any delay in generic entry 
comes with a significant decrease in the chances of having a 
generic competition at all. This is only partially offset by a 
much smaller effect for each additional year from patent loss.
In Columns (4) and (5), we further include market size 
proxies (Sales LOP and Sales) interacted with the difficulty 
of manufacturing to check how the impact of market size 
may vary according to manufacturing difficulty. Market size 
is evaluated at each level of manufacturing complexity. We 
only find some mixed evidence, depending on the market 
size variables used. Higher market size prior to patent loss 
for molecules of difficult manufacturing increases the likeli-
hood of entry, whereas this effect only holds for molecules 
of easy manufacturing if we use sales as market proxy.
Market share
Conditional on generic entry, we look at the diffusion of 
generic products by examining the determinants of their 
market share. We use system GMM to estimate the coef-
ficients of interest. The lagged market share and the price 
variables are instrumented using the full set of their own 
lags. The Hansen test is used to determine the validity of the 
instruments; however, as T grows the number of instruments 
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may overfit the number of endogenous variables and the 
Hansen test may not be robust. To ameliorate this problem, 
we follow [44] and use a collapsed matrix of instruments.
Table 4 shows the results of the second stage in our 
analysis. All specifications include the lagged market share, 
market size proxy, intermolecular competition proxy, years 
since patent expired, difficulty of manufacturing and NICE 
recommendations. Column (1) shows the results when the 
price variable is defined as the ratio of generic to branded 
prices. There exists certain degree of market share depend-
ency, with a 10% increase in the market share in t leading to 
a 4% increase in the market share in t + 1 . The relative price 
is negative and precisely estimated, indicating that a larger 
price ratio (closer generic price to the branded product) the 
lower the market share. Another variable we examine in rela-
tion to market share is the impact of TA guidance issued 
by NICE. If the TA recommends a restricted use, there is 
a 10% decrease in the generic market share with respect to 
those molecules with no TA. If the TA recommends the use 
of medicine, the share increases by about 18% compared 
to those molecules for which there is no TA. Estimates in 
Column (1) are potentially biased due to the simultaneity 
Table 3  Likelihood of Generic 
Entry—Additional checks
Notes: See notes in Table 2. Specifications in column (1)–(3) include a dummy for entry delay (Delay), 
years since patent loss (Years LOP) and their interaction. Coefficients not reported here. The APEs 
account for overall marginal effect of the variable of interest on the probability of generic entry. Years LOP 
(Delay=1) shows the effect of years since LOP when there is no immediate generic entry. Columns (4) and 
(5) include the interaction between market size variables and difficulty of manufacturing. The APEs for the 
market size are evaluated at each level of manufacturing difficulty. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Dep. Variable: generic entry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales
LOP Quantiles LOP
Market Size 0.0645*** 0.00866
(0.0197) (0.0242)
MSize (Easy) 0.0469 0.0339**
(0.0330) (0.0172)
MSize (Difficult) 0.0568*** 0.0383
(0.0204) (0.0242)








Delay − 0.251*** − 0.315*** − 0.273***
(0.0968) (0.110) (0.0914)
Years LOP (Delay=1) 0.0377* 0.0384** 0.0387***
(0.0193) (0.0156) (0.0141)
Num 0.188*** 0.250*** 0.217*** 0.178*** 0.193***
(0.0650) (0.0835) (0.0551) (0.0531) (0.0534)
Difficult 0.195** 0.273** 0.180* 0.162 0.147
(0.0849) (0.129) (0.101) (0.256) (0.243)
Combination 0.0610 0.0602 0.0462 0.881** 0.827**
(0.0518) (0.0696) (0.0493) (0.345) (0.337)
NICE TA Rest − 0.0431 − 0.0492 − 0.0586 − 0.0249 − 0.0223
(0.0472) (0.0660) (0.0640) (0.0448) (0.0500)
NICE TA Rec 0.0768 0.115 0.0499 0.0723 0.102
(0.0762) (0.146) (0.0922) (0.0745) (0.0907)
Observations 649 649 649 649 649
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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between market share and prices. The Hansen test supports 
the hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. 
Specifications in Column (2) through to Column (10) treat 
the price variable as endogenous. Results in Column (2) 
show similar results to Column (1) for the lagged market 
share and NICE recommendation. The main difference is 
that price is not precisely estimated, the variable Years LOP 
becomes significant but negative and the market size vari-
able (measured by total molecule sales) is now significant, 
indicating larger markets see a larger diffusion of generic 
medicines.
In our data, we observe some molecules with a relative 
price higher than one12. Some molecules show this trend 
consistently in the years after patent expires, or appears as a 
one-off phenomenon indicating sporadic price modulations. 
In Column (3) we exclude from the sample those molecules 
that show this consistent pattern and in Column (4) we fur-
ther exclude those with one-off relative price abnormali-
ties13. Overall, the results are similar to those in Column (2), 
with the exception that the lagged market share has a bigger 
impact on the current share and that the share decreases if 
molecules are of difficult manufacturing.
Column (5) includes a quadratic term for the variable 
Years LOP to check if there is a non-linearity in the maturity 
of the market, but no effect is found. In [48] the relative price 
is defined as the ratio of the generic product to the branded 
price before the patent loss. We use this definition of rela-
tive price in Column (6) to find similar results to those in 
Column (2). All specifications have used the variable Num, 
which is a measure of intermolecular competition. In Col-
umn (7) we add the variable catM, which is a measure of 
intramolecular competition only available from 2005 as dis-
cussed in Sect.  4. Column (8) add the interaction of catM 
with sales to check whether the effect of a more competitive 
market varies by market size. However, we find no effect 
of competition on generic diffusion. The last two checks in 
Table  4 show the results when including the branded price 
and the interaction between market size and difficulty of 
manufacturing in Columns (9) and (10), respectively. There 
is a significant positive effect of the branded price in Column 
(9), suggesting for medicines with the higher branded price 
the generic market share increases. The last column shows 
that in large markets, molecules of manufacturing classed as 
a combination have a smaller market penetration.
Overall results are quite stable for the lag of the market 
share and the impact that NICE guidance has on captur-
ing a larger generic share. Generic market share is quite 
state dependent, with a 10% increase in market share in the 
current year leading to an average 5% share increase in the 
following year. The effect of a restricted TA is to lower the 
market share between 9% and 13% compared to those mol-
ecules with no TA, and to increase the generic share between 
10% and 26% if the TA recommends the product. There is 
also evidence supporting the higher degree of generic diffu-
sion in larger molecule markets.
Conclusions
This paper examines generic entry and diffusion in the UK 
for molecules that lost patent between 2003 and 2012. There 
were about 60 molecules that lost patent in this period across 
nine ATC groups. The benefits of generic entry typically 
entail a reduction in generic prices, which drop even further 
as the number of generic competitors increase. Our empiri-
cal approach involved two stages. In stage one we examined 
the determinants of generic entry. There are large implica-
tions of generic entry in terms of expenditure savings from 
the payers’ perspective. Our dataset shows that only 41 out 
of the 60 molecules have generic coverage, and about 10 of 
those experience a delay in a generic entry from the time the 
patent expires. Therefore, understanding the factors driving 
entry is key to the development of policies to correct for the 
lack of generic competition for certain molecules.
In the second part of our analysis, and conditional on 
generic entry we look into generic diffusion by examining 
the drivers of market share. We approach the analysis look-
ing at the supply side. Given that all molecules experience 
patent loss under the same regulatory environment and 
policy changes, we focus on the role that health technology 
assessment plays in generic entry and diffusion. In particu-
lar, our analysis examines the role of NICE guidance in the 
generic market. NICE issues technology appraisals for new 
and existing medicines recommending their use based on a 
cost-utility comparison. The existence of such official guid-
ance may intrinsically contribute to capture a larger share of 
the molecule market, bringing cost-savings from the payer’s 
perspective. To the best of our knowledge this is the first 
paper to focus on the role of health technology assessment 
and, in particular, the role of NICE, in generic entry and 
diffusion.
Our results suggest that generic entry is affected by mar-
ket size, and that large markets signal the level of expected 
profitability for potential entrants and consequently are more 
12 Our variables are aggregated at the molecule level and therefore 
any behaviour of specific formulations can’t be accounted for in 
detail. A common explanation will be cases where a particular for-
mulation was classed as Category C being type of products “which 
are not readily available as a generic, where the price is based on a 
particular proprietary product, manufacturer or as the case may be 
supplier” (https ://psnc.org.uk/dispe nsing -suppl y/endor semen t/how-
the-price -chang e-mecha nism-works /).
13 In Column (3) we exclude molecules Calcipotriol, Fentanyl, Ipra-
tropium Bromide and Salbutamol. In addition to these molecules we 
further exclude in Column (4) Cilazapril, Fosinopril, Galantamine 
and Trandolapril.
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likely to attract generic competitors. This is in line to the 
findings in the literature suggesting that the single most 
important factor of generic competition is market size [30, 
42, 48]. Intermolecular competition within the same ATC 
group is also promoting generic entry, with each additional 
competing molecule losing patent within the same ATC 
increasing the likelihood of entry between 18 and 27pp. As 
opposed to [46] complexity of manufacturing, included here 
as a proxy of manufacturing costs indicate complex mol-
ecules are more likely to enter the market than those with 
easier manufacturing. This could be explained by potential 
entrants anticipating higher competition in markets where 
the product is of easy manufacturing. Our estimates also 
suggest that delays in generic entry after the patent expires 
decrease the probability of entry on average by 28pp. In the 
absence of no immediate entry after patent loss, the market 
may signal lack of profitability.
In our second stage analysis, we find there are two main 
factors driving generic diffusion. The first one is the market 
share in the previous year. The second is the existence of 
NICE TAs. This is in contrast to the findings in the first part, 
where we could only find marginal evidence of an effect of 
NICE TAs on generic entry. Quantitatively, the effects are 
large, molecules with a TA that recommends their use hav-
ing between 10% and 26% larger market share compared to 
those molecules for which there is no NICE TA. If the mol-
ecule has a TA with restricted recommendation the market 
share is between 9% and 13% lower than the market share 
for molecules with no TA. In particular, given the type of 
TAs included in the analysis, it could be argued that MTAs 
can be a useful tool to support the use of generic medicines. 
There is some evidence of larger increases in market share 
as generic prices become cheaper relative to the branded 
products, as in [4] and [45] but this is not robust to all speci-
fications presented. One of the most striking results is that 
neither intermolecular nor intramolecular competition has an 
effect on the market share. However, the results for the intra-
molecular competition should be taken with caution as we 
do not have accurate information on the number of generic 
competitors in the market, only a proxy CatM that indicates 
whether there are more than three competitors.
The impact of health technology appraisal has been 
largely ignored in the literature, with all efforts focused on 
the impact of regulation and market structure on the generic 
competition. Our results suggest large effects in generic dif-
fusion for molecules that were subject to a TA recommenda-
tion by NICE. Several caveats related to the NICE TAs are 
worth mentioning. First, our sample includes data for the UK 
and NICE is an HTA organisation initially covering England 
only; however, Wales and Northern Ireland formally recog-
nise NICE guidance. Scotland is also involved in the devel-
opment stage of NICE guidance. In practice, this is likely to 
bring very similar recommendations and, therefore, we do not 
expect this to bias our results. Second, NICE issues TAs for 
specific products which are recommendations and hence the 
uptake of these recommendations by clinicians may differ. 
Third, TAs may evolve and transform into clinical guidelines. 
We do not account for these adjustments and our analysis 
captures only whether the molecule is recommended in light 
of the clinical and economic evidence. The transition of a TA 
into clinical guideline is likely to consolidate generic use in 
the molecule market, and this could be indicative of a lower 
effect during the period for which there is a TA only com-
pared to an expected larger effect when the TA translates into 
clinical guidance. This only means that in considering TA 
only, our estimates are a lower bound of the NICE TA effect.
Finally, the sample contains information on generic 
entry at the molecule level and we are unable to identify 
within each generic molecule market whether there exist 
branded generics, differences across formulations or num-
ber of generic competitors. This is challenging specially as 
there might be some market differences across these that 
warrant further examination. For instance, our results in 
Table 4 show sub-sample analysis as we identified some 
prices for which the relative prices were above one. This 
could be explained by some medicines being classified under 
a special reimbursement category, due to problems in the 
supply chain of the product, or even due to the presence 
of branded generics. The presence of branded generics is 
specially important as they may hinder competition. This is 
beyond the scope of our analysis and our data does not allow 
going into this level of detail, but further research could 
explore whether branded generics curbs generic competition, 
as in [2] and [43].
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